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BEFORE THE MORNING AFTER
GRAHAM T. ALLISON*
I. AMERICA IS THREATENED
In April of 1995, home-grown American terrorists parked a
rented Ryder truck packed with fertilizer-based explosives outside
the Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City.1 As noted at trial,
their objective was to deliver the weapons during a period in which
they might get a high body-count.2 They succeeded in killing 168
American men, women and children.'
Two years earlier, Sheik Rahman, an Egyptian Islamic cleric,
and his collaborators rented a minivan, packed it with fertilizer-based
explosives and parked it in the basement of the World Trade Center.4
They anticipated that the resulting blast would cause one World
Trade Center tower to fall on the other The trial revealed that their
ultimate targets were not just the World Trade Center, but also the
United Nations building, the Federal Office Building in lower Man-
hattan, the George Washington Bridge and the Lincoln and Holland
*Graham Allison is the Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at
Harvard University, and is the former Dean of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Govern-
ment. Until March 1994, Dr. Allison served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and
Plans where he coordinated Department of Defense strategy and policy towards Russia,
Ukraine, and the other States of the former Soviet Union. He continues to serve as Special
Advisor to the Secretary of Defense.
1. See Jo Thomas, After Two Years, Bombing Trial is Set to Begin, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1997, § 1, at Al.
2. See Pete Slover, McVeigh Admitted Bombing, Memos Say; His Attorney Disputes
Document's Credibility, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 1, 1997, at Al.
3. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 1.
4. See Ralph Blumenthal, The Twin Towers: The Overview; Inquiry Traces Suspect to Oc-
cupied Territories, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, § 1, at 38; Mary B.W. Tabor, Specter of Terror:
U.S. Indicts Egyptian Cleric as Head of Group Plotting "War of Urban Terrorism," N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 1993, at Al.
5. See Alasdair Palmer, Man with 10 Faces Stands Trial for New York Bomb, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, May 12,1996, at 23.
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tunnels.6 They hoped to kill a large number of Americans. If they
had parked their minivan in the right place, they could have killed
forty thousand people
The Aum Shinrikyo attack, too, makes chilling reading. In To-
kyo, Japan, normally thought to be an orderly city, a religious sect
called Aum Shinrikyo operated a chemical weapons factory! The
sect also had a fifty thousand-acre farm in Australia where they at-
tempted to mine uranium and tested their chemical weapons on
sheep! Well-funded, with $1 billion in the bank, the sect actively
searched for nuclear materials in Russia.0 Their mission was to de-
stroy the Japanese government.
The Oklahoma City, World Trade Center, and Aum Shinrikyo
examples remind us that the threats of megaterrorism12 are not mere
hypotheticals. Imagine the result if the World Trade Center van, or
the Oklahoma City truck, were packed not with fertilizer-based ex-
plosives, but with a thirty-pound lump of highly-enriched uranium,
about the size of a grapefruit. With that lump, technology available
from Radio Shack, a design off the internet, and a couple hundred
thousand dollars, the bombers would be equipped to accomplish their
missions. The Oklahoma City bombers would have entirely leveled
Oklahoma City. The World Trade Center bombers would have lev-
eled Wall Street and the entire tip of Manhattan up to Gramercy
Park." A second circle of destruction would look like the federal of-
fice building in Oklahoma City-with very few survivors inside. 4
6. See Richard Bernstein, Bomb Plot Defendant Shifts Plea to Guilty and Implicates Oth-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,1995, at Al.
7. See Tom Mashberg & Michael Rezendes, World Trade Center Rocked by Bomb,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27,1993, at 1.
8. See Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum
Shinrikyo: Hearings Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. 89 (1995)
(statement of the Staff of the Subcomm. on Investigations).
9. See Australia Believes Sect Tested Gas on Ranch, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,1995, at Ag.
10. See William J. Broad, Seismic Mystery in Australia: Quake, Meteor, or Nuclear Blast?,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1997, at Cl.
11. See Norman Kempster, U.S. Vulnerable to Cult Attacks, Senator Nunn Says, L.A.
TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1995, at As; Nicholas D. Kristof, A Guru's Journey-A Special Report; The
Seer Among the Blind: Japanese Sect Leader's Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,1995, § 1, at 1.
12. Terrorism using a weapon of mass destruction such as chemical, biological or nuclear
weapons.
13. See GRAHAM T. ALLISON ET AL., AVOIDING NUCLEAR ANARCHY 1 (1996).
14. See id.
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II. WHAT IS THE THREAT?
These three examples answer this question quite vividly. How-
ever, conventional wisdom in American politics and most public
opinion continues to repeat a mantra: We face no direct threats to the
United States today in the aftermath of the Cold War."5 President
Clinton voiced this view in the State of the Union message last Feb-
mary, stating that there are no direct threats to American security
today. 6 Contrast this with the answer FBI Director Louis Freeh gave
at a Congressional hearing when he was asked whether the United
States is under a greater threat from nuclear detonation now than at
the height of the Cold War. He answered bluntly,
[I]f you describe that nation as a criminal, or terrorist, or rogue op-
eration, I think the answer would be yes. The controls that were in
place for many of these weapons and structures [during the Cold
War] don't apply to a terrorist or organized criminal, or an oppor-
tunist who could get access to them.'7
The greatest external threat to American lives and liberties to-
day is the threat of "loose nukes"-- the theft and sale of Russian
weapons or weapons-useable material to a terrorist group or rogue
state. For the first time in history, we can trace a very plausible path
by which a terrorist group, like Sheik Rahman or the Oklahoma City
bombers, could acquire a crude nuclear device and use it against an
American target, at home or abroad.
III. WHY NOW?
If the Cold War is over and our nuclear nemesis has "retargeted"
its nuclear weapons, why does a nuclear threat still hang over us?
The answer is that the demise of the Soviet Union left behind an
arsenal of thirty thousand nuclear warheads and seventy thousand
nuclear weapons-equivalents--lumps of highly-enriched uranium and
plutonium." These items are now located in a society convulsed by a
revolution whose central control systems cannot even collect taxes.
Russian society has become increasingly free, increasingly chaotic,
15. See id.
16. See President's Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union,
33 WKLY. COmp. PRES. DOc. 136,136 (Feb. 10,1997).
17. Int'l Crime And Terrorism: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 105th
Cong., available in Washington Alert, Transcripts Library, Congressional Hearings File (1997)
(statement of Louis Freeh, Dir. of the FBI).
18. See 138 CONG. REc. H4135-01 (daily ed. June 4,1992) (statement of Rep. Burton).
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and increasingly criminalized. 9
For example, Dr. Nachaev, the head of Chelyabinsk, one of the
two major weapons-design facilities in Russia,' committed suicide
last year.21 He had been making nuclear weapons for the past twenty
years, running the equivalent of America's Los Alamos or Liver-
more.' He left a suicide note which read, "I can no longer fulfill my
professional responsibilities."' He had taken out a loan the prior
year to pay the thirty thousand scientists and technicians he em-
ployed. Because he was unable to repay the loan and pay his em-
ployees, he killed himself.' Mr. Nachaev could have taken other
desperate measures. He could have put twenty weapons or weapons-
equivalents into an airplane and flown to Iran or Iraq or Afghanistan,
or any number of other locations.
Another example of conditions in Russia today is reflected in the
prosecution of Mr. Klevnov. Mr. Klevnov, the Chief of Staff of the
Russian Navy, is being prosecuted by the Pacific Fleet for misappro-
priations from the sale of ships to South Korea." He claims that he
was going to use the money for building houses for his men.6 The
head of the Pacific Fleet of Russia could have chosen to sell some-
thing other than ships without a problem.
In Russia today, the good news is an explosion of freedom. The
prison walls have been broken down7 The bad news is that the peo-
ple who are charged with arming, protecting and managing a vast su-
perpower nuclear arsenal are now free to do most anything they
choose.'
IV. WHY HAS MORE NOT YET HAPPENED?
The answer to this question remains a puzzle. For a long time
people have tried to convince one another that terrorists lack the mo-
19. See R. Adam Moody, Armageddon for Hire, INT'L DEF. REV., Feb. 1,1997, at 21.
20. See generally 138 CONG. REC. S3756-01, S3760 (1992).
21. See Grigory A. Yavlinsky, Death of a Scientist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,1996, at A2.
22. See supra note 20.
23. Yavlinsky, supra note 21, at A2.
24. See id.
25. See Russian General Arrested in Alleged Military Corruption, Associated Press, July
11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4874538.
26. See id.
27. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 13, at 1-2 (describing the impact of the 1989 fall of the
Berlin Wall on the Soviet Union).
28. See id at 2,11,36-37.
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tivation to kill a large number of people.2 9 Terrorists want to kill only
a few because they are trying to focus attention on their cause rather
than to destroy just for the sake of being destructive.' But Sheik
Rahman and Aum Shinrikyo are exceptions." Indeed, some ethi-
cally-motivated or "millennial" groups actually have as part of their
mythology a vast catharsis, a destruction of large groups.2
One deterrent to a further increase in terrorist activity has been
higher levels of professionalism among the Russians charged with
containing and controlling these materials than one would have rea-
sonably hoped for.33 There are thousands of people in Russia today
who could take, at their own discretion, weapons or weapons-
equivalents and become rich.' Considering that Russian nuclear
workers have not been paid regularly,35 it is fairly remarkable that
many of them do their jobs. It is something for which we should be
thankful.
Another deterrent is that terrorists need to be competent, and
fortunately, many of the groups that would like to be very destructive
are not very effective. Sheik Rahman's people parked their van in
the wrong place?6 They had no structural engineer as part of their
29. See John F. Sopko, The Changing Proliferation Threat, FOREIGN POL'Y, Dec. 1996, at
3, 11 (stating that "For years it was thought that terrorist groups imposed some self-restraint.
As espoused by terrorism experts, terrorists or their state sponsors did not want to cause too
many casualties, as it would destroy sympathy and support for their cause.").
30. See Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism A Real Threat?, 8 JANE'S INTELLIGENCE
REV. 422, 424 (1996) (stating that "Mass murder is a relatively rare terrorist phenomenon
since, in most cases, killing a handful is as effective for achieving group goals.").
31. See id. at 424-25 (stating that "Religious terrorist groups appear to have a higher level
of lethality than most other types of groups .... Religion... can morally justify and even re-
quire the sort of indiscriminate violence that most secular terrorists would regard as immoral
and counter-productive.").
32. See generally Sopko, supra note 29, at 11 (stating that "[R]eligious... or simply politi-
cally disaffected groups have become more aggressive in seeking to further their aims by using
weapons that cause large-scale casualties.").
33. See, e.g., Owen R. Cot6, Jr., The Russian Nuclear Archipelago, in GRAHAM T.
ALLISON ET AL, AVOIDING NUCLEAR ANARCHY 177, app. A, at 188 (1996) (describing the
discovery by Kazakh officials of 600 kilograms of HEU that "fell through the cracks" of the
nuclear material accounting system of the FSU); ALLISON, supra note 13, at 30-31 (stating that
the Russian military "has done a remarkably good job under extremely difficult circumstances"
of guarding its inventory of nuclear weapons).
34. See generally ALLISON Er AL, supra note 13, at 28-29, 40, 48 (stating that both among
ordinary Russian citizens and the special troops assigned to guard weapons storage facilities,
"harsh economic conditions can create incentives for nuclear theft and smuggling.").
35. See id. at 28 n.17.
36. See Matthew Wald, Figuring Out What It Would Take To Down A Tower, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1993, §4, at 5.
1997]
12 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW
group.' Aum Shinrikyo had an ineffective dispersal mechanism for
the gases that it tried to release in the Tokyo subway.' However, one
would not want to count on such ineffective planning.
Finally, the countermeasures that the United States has em-
ployed have made a significant difference. The Central Intelligence
Agency does a good job trying to muddy the markets, so that the
people who are trying to buy or to sell weapons, or weapons-useable
material, believe they might be caught. In Avoiding Nuclear Anar-
chy, a book written by me and three of my colleagues at Harvard,39
we document six public cases in which people attempting to sell sto-
len weapons-useable material were caught.' These are the cases we
know about. There are dozens of additional cases that are not pub-
licly documented.41 What should concern us most are the cases that
we do not know about. We are living on borrowed time.
V. WHAT SHOULD WE BE DOING ABOUT IT?
The short answer is that we should ask ourselves what we would
do on the morning after the first nuclear terrorist incident.
First, we would recognize this as a Category One 2 threat. The
assertion that there are no direct threats to the United States today in
the aftermath of the Cold War would be meaningless.
Second, we would mount a high-priority, all-azimuth program of
action appropriate to a Category One threat, the same way our De-
fense Department does in other domains,43 and the way our society
can do when we mobilize ourselves. The fourth section of our book,
Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, details a very extensive program,' but
here let me lay out the most pressing opportunities for action.
The Bush administration negotiated a contract with the Russian
37. See Peter Benesh, The Terrors of the Earth, Pri. POST GAzErrI, Sept. 28, 1995, at
Al.
38. See Sopko, supra note 29, at 8 (stating that the "crude" delivery system used by Aum
Shinrikyo "consisted of plastic bags of sarin punctured by the tips of umbrellas").
39. See ALLISON ETAL., supra note 13.
40. See id. at 23-27.
41. See id. at 23-24.
42. A threat that would trump all others. In the case of U.S. dealings with Russia and
other former Soviet Republics, it would be considered to be more important than, for example,
promoting democracy, or even stabilizing the economy.
43. See Lieutenant Col. Winters, The 1994 United States National Security Strategy, ARMY
LAW., Jan. 1995, at 62.
44. See id. at 147-76.
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government to buy five hundred tons of highly-enriched uranium,"u
which is about half of the uranium left in that country. The contract
is being implemented, but very slowly.' Presently, it is a $12 million
contract over twenty years, but it would be about half that price if it
were executed now. 7 We should buy the material in the next two to
four years and dilute it to low-enriched uranium so that it could be
used as fuel rods in civilian reactors. What we buy and take becomes
secure only when it reaches our soil. For example, we bought one
thousand pounds of highly-enriched uranium that had been left in
Kazakhstan and is now in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.'
However, the problem is not about the material we buy, but
rather the material left behind. Therefore, we should strictly condi-
tion our willingness to buy and take on specific steps that Russia must
take toward securing the leftover material. The key words are: buy,
take, and condition. Russia should concentrate the remaining mate-
rial in the fewest possible locations and control those locations like a
bank vault.49 Control systems should also be implemented and in-
clude regularly paying the guardians of these materials, since no
physical control system is invulnerable if the people who are running
the system are starving.
Some may argue that Russia would never agree to this plan or
that the plan is impossible to execute.50 However, the example of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) demonstrates a successful ana-
logue and suggests otherwise.5 The IMF provides substantial sums of
money to Russia, but strictly conditions the receipt of that money
upon specific actions required of the government. The action-reward
45. See generally Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched
Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, Feb. 18, 1993, U.S.-Russ., Hein's No. KAV 3503,
Temp. State Dep't No. 93-59.
46. For a comprehensive look at the HEU Deal, see Richard A. Falkenrath, The HEU
Deal, in ALLISON ET AL., supra note 13, app. C.
47. See id.
48. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Kazakhstan had Lax Security; Americans Detail Story of Ura-
nium Removal, WASH. POST, Nov. 24,1994, at A52.
49. For a discussion of the problems with multiple storage locations, see generally Cotd,
supra note 33.
50. But see, e.g., David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag, Carrying a Big Carrot: Linking
Multilateral Disarmament and Development Assistance, 91 COLUM. L. Rnv. 993 (1991) (finding
the use of the IMF to be a mistake).
51. For an article finding the use of the IMF to be a mistake, however, see Cynthia C.
Lichtenstein, Aiding the Transformation of Economies: Is the Fund's Conditionality Appropri-
ate to the Task?, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 961 (1994).
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connection is tight and systematized. It involves a monthly loan of
$340 million 2 conditioned on Russia meeting specific requirements
regarding collecting taxes, fighting terrorism, adjusting their budget,
and paying wages. 3 When Russia fails to meet the requirements, the
IvF withholds the loan.' These requirements are both in Russia's
interest and in the interest of the world and the IMF. The action-
reward connection has lowered inflation from about 2500% a year in
1992 to less than 20% a year currently.' This effect is a success more
striking than one could have imagined. 6 Using a similar program, we
must convince Russia, which now does not make control of loose nu-
clear weapons or weapons-usable material a priority, to take ade-
quate actions to stabilize and secure its nuclear arsenal and stockpile.
This year, or next year, when Americans find themselves victims
of a nuclear terrorist threat, how will the nation account for its be-
havior? Certainly the President, the leaders of Congress, and the
public will not be able to claim credibly that they did not really know
of such a threat. We must act now-before the morning after.
52. In 1996 the IMF began a new three-year loan program worth $10 billion, or $280 mil-
lion a month. See IMF to Resume Russian Loans, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 4, 1997, News-
Europe at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fintime File.
53. For an article describing the concept, see Irene A. Belot, Note, The Role of the IMF
and the World Bank in Rebuilding the CIS, 9 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. LJ. 83 (1995).
54. For a recent case where loans to Russia were suspended, see IMF to Resume Russian
Loans, supra note 52, at 2; see also IMF Releases 700 Million Dollar Loan Installment to Russia,
Agence France Presse, Sept. 4,1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
55. See Russia Brings Down Inflation, FIN. TIMES (U.S.), Jan. 7, 1997, News-Europe at 2,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Fintime File. For a report on inflation for 1997, see Infla-
tion down in Russia, FIN. TIMES (London), May 2,1997, News-Europe at 2, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Fintime File. For a somewhat negative view regarding future inflation in Rus-
sia, see Ruble Re-denomination Expected to Fuel Inflation, J. COM., Aug. 12, 1997, Finance at
2A, available in LEXIS, News Library, JOC File. For a technical treatment of inflation in Rus-
sia, see generally BRIG=rrE GRANVILLE & JUDITH SHAPIRO, RUSSIAN INFLATION: A
STATISTICAL PANDORA'S Box (The Royal Institute of International Affairs Discussion Paper
No. 53, 1994); see also BRIGrrE GRANVILLE & JuDrrH SHAPIRO, LESS INFLATION, LESS
POVERTY: FIRST RESULTS FOR RUSSIA (Royal Institute of International Affairs Discussion
Paper No. 68,1996).
56. See generally Impact of IMF/World Bank Policies Toward Russia and the Russian
Economy: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 133rd
Cong. (1994). For an early account of the result of the economic reforms, see generally
BRIGIT=E GRANVILLE, THE SUCCESS OF RUSSIAN ECONOMC REFORMS (1995). For a more
recent account, see generally NICOLAS H. STERN & JOHN HICKS, THE TRANSITON IN
EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: SOME STRATEGIC LESSONS FROM THE
EXPERIENCE OF 25 COUNTRIES OVER SIX YEARS (European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment Working Paper No. 18,1997).
